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so we may take leave of the case with the remark, that there
is not wanting in judicial records a precedent for Portia's
final act-the passing upon Shylock of a penal sentence for
attempting the life of a citizen.'
On the whole, therefore, we perceive no error in the
record, and it follows that Professor Love's assignment of
error should be dismissed. The decree of the Venetian
Court should be affirmed, and thus tardy justice will be done
to the learned Portia. She has been called a "pettifogger ;" but even if there are some who will dissent from my
view of her opinion, yet all, I think, will admit that she deserves no such appellation. How lacking in gallantry have
her stern legal critics been, even assuming their criticisms
to be well founded ! And it is surely a surprising thing
that Professor Love should be found among their number.
For was it not Portia who, with matchless eloquence, exhorted the Jew to be merciful? And who should be so
ready to show mercy as Love?

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION IN
TILDEN v. GREEN.
13Y R. C. MCMURTRIE, EsQ.

Criticism of a decision' of a foreign court is of all
things the most dangerous.
No one that has watched
such attempts upon subjects he is familiar with, can have
failed to see that local notions and statutes cannot be readily
comprehended by strangers. Two illustrations will suffice.
Mr. Bell, Professor of Law in the University of Edinburgh,
deduces this result from a study of Kent's Commentaries:
"The law of the United States (respecting sales of personal property) . . . is grounded on the law of England,
and has indeed been settled nearly on the footing of the
I See an instance of a sentence of this kind in connection with a civil
suit in a court administering Spanish law, in an article by John T. Doyle,
in The Overland Monthly for July, 1889. Venetian law was presumably
the same.
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Statute of Frauds as applicable to all contracts for the
the sale of goods and chattels for the price of $5o or more.
.
The Statute of Frauds, as thus adopted in
America, has years ago been reconstructedby the Legislature of New York .....
.The law of America, standing

on the same footing as that of England under the Statute
of Frauds, the precise words of which had been adopted
in the American Statute, etc."

The other illustration is

the disclaimer by Lord Campbell of the power assumed by
the courts of the United States to declare a statute void as
illegal.
Such examples may well deter one from attempting a
criticism of such a decision as that of Tilden v. Green. 2
But there are some grounds upon which this decision
seems to rest, that may without arrogance-even with profit
-be discussed by a foreigner, for they profess to be principles of the common law.
The case decides that a charity which requires a discretion of trustees to organize it, a charity where the form
and mode of operation are not sufficiently defined to enable
a court to compel its execution in that mode, is void. So
far as this results from local statutes, or a common law of
the State differing from the law of England, it would
probably be unwise, at least for a foreigner, to criticise the
conclusion. But if these or either of them are the grounds,
it is unfortunate that other reasons were resorted to. Distrust and uncertainty are the invariable result of a double
postulate, one branch of which is either untrue or misunderstood. Moreover it is, to some extent at least, to be inferred
that the alleged local statutes are deemed to be legislation
in the line of what is assumed to have been the common law,
until marred by the arrogant assumption of ecclesiastic
chancellors. This is quite evident from the dissertation
by WRIGHT, J., in 33 New York, 97, lo6, one of the foun-

dations for the judgment in the Tilden case. Moreover, that
judgment does, it is submitted, utterly misstate as well as
misunderstand the object and effect of the Statute of 9
I Bell's Contract of Sale, pp. 59 and 62.
2 31

American Law Register and Review, 75.
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Ceo. II, and it is supported, as on a sure and sound foundation, by the assertiofn that the jurisdiction by which
these estates were protected and preserved rests on the
4 3 d Eliz.-which is a matter offact, not of opinion, and
is demonstrably untrue.
These are apparently the postulates on which this
decision is based by Mr. Justice BROWN and the majority
of the Court: First, the statement of Judge WRIGHT, in
Levy v. Levy:' "If there is a siigep5ostulateof the common law established by an unbroken line of decisions it is
that a trust without a certain beneficiary who can claim its
enforcement is void."
Second: " The equitable rule that
firevailed in the English Court of Chancery, known as the
Cy-Pres doctrine, and which is afifilied to ufihold gfls for
charitablepurposes, when no beneficiary is named, has no
.placein the Jurisfrudenceof this State."

There is a third postulate, for which Read v. Williams ' is cited as the authority. An indefinite purpose to
be executed by a power given to a devisee, as a trustee, is
contrary to the Statute of Wills, because it substitutes the
will of the donee for that of the testator. Precisely what
is meant by the abstraction quoted from Read v. Williams
is uncertain. It may be that a devise to A. for life, and
remainder to his appointees, is illegal under the New York
statutes. It is if the statement of the reason for the decision is true. If it means what was admitted in Morice v.
Bishop of Durham, it is a singularly caricatured statement of that rule. In either case the reason assigned for
the rule cannot be the true one as applied to statutes of
wills as such.
It would naturally be inferred from the above-quoted
passage that there was some occult and mysterious quality in
the Statute of Wills that produces this effect; whereas the
cause is the same which operates to make it impossible to
get rid of water in a bucket, unless it is placed somewhere
else. Did it ever occur to ask what is the rule in the case
of a grant? In this respect how do deeds and wills differ?
If they do not, certainly it is not the policy of the Statute
1.3.3 NI. Y., X07 .

2 Us5

N. Y., 56o.
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of Wills that produces the rule that property must have an
owner.
Compare this portentous declaration with the simplicity
of Sir WILLIAM GRANT.' A trust without a beneficiary is
void, because an uncontrollable jbower of disposition is
ownershif. Ownership in the trustee being excluded by
the fact that he is a trustee, there can be none unless the
Court can ascertain who is the owner. But charities are
an exception, because .the Court or the Crown will direct
the peculiar application. A trust is a means, not an end.
Ownership is the end or object. If there is none mentioned
there would be a deed without a grantee, or a will without
a devisee; that is, an incompleted attempt to grant. The
principle is the one common to all conceivable modes of
transferring property, whether by contract, deed, will or
law.
One cannot help being curious to learn if these were
the points which counsel were expected to meet to sustain
the trust. For it is quite certain that it was these very
objections to a trust for charitable uses, that forty-eight
years ago were supposed to exist and were relied on in the
case of Girard's Will. They were then met and (it was
supposed) demolished by the great argument of Mr.
BINNEY in that case as they had been before by Mr. Justice
BALDWIN, in Magill v.Brown.

It may therefore be per-

mitted, without incurring the charge of arrogance, to
point out where the fallacies lie in each one of these postulates, for the purpose of relegating the Tilden will case
to the category of an unfortunate provincial peculiarity of
no importance to anyone but the people that are living
under such a system of law.
There is a bit of the argument that deserves notice,
first, because it seems to present such a specimen of reasoning as to cast doubt on the validity of the residue. Inglis
v. The Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor' is got over by
this statement, which appears to be meant for reasoning.
There was there a direction to apply for legislation creating
a corporation, if such application was necessary to render
1 9 Ves., 4o5.

2

3 Peters, 99.
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the devise valid. Here the creation of the corporation was
in the discretion of the executors. Surely, if the discretionary element in the gift of the power to create a body
capable of taking, holding and administering was fatal
because legality or illegality must depend on things as they
are at the death of the testator, there was the same mere
discretion in the case of Inglis v. The Trustees as in Mr.
Tilden's will-granting the trustees could be compelled to
apply, could the legislature be compejled to grant? Moreover, it is a singular notion of discretion, surely, that holds
that a trustee's discretion cannot be controlled. What this
word means it would be quite impossible to discuss at
length here ; but certainly it has never been heard of that
a trustee could destroy a person's rights by declining to
exercise this discretion. Blunders enough there are as to
the meaning of the word, but no one before appears to have
so misunderstood its meaning. It means, if we may be
guided by authority, that he must do what is most beneficial

to the owner.'

No 9ne has stated the rule better than the

great American Chancellor,

DESSAUSURE, SO

that we need

not fear being snubbed for resorting to English precedents,
invented by ecclesiastics and not applicable to a free
people.
The supposed distinction between that which is private
property and a gift to a class, or an object, or a purpose by
any description that constitutes a charity, -will be noticed
further on. All that need be said here is, that by the
common law, if we include equity within that definition,
there has never been a time when a class such as the blind,
or the ioor, or the sick was not as absolutely capable of
taking by a gift or grant as fudividual persons are. Such
a mode of dealing--with not a case but a great principle of
law such as was elaborated in the Sailors' Snug Harbor case
-can scarcely commend itself to the judgment of men.
If it is conceived that there is a distinction between a discretion which is necessary to make a right in a private
person capable of enjoyment, and a discretion to select
'Harper's Equity, 114; Haynes v. Cox, per Dessausure, Ch.; Mislington v. Mulgrave, 3 Madd., 491; In re Coleman, 39 Ch. Div., 446.
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objects of a charitable gift, it is submitted that this is a
mistake for which there is no foundation, but a dictum of
Lord LOUGHEORO followed, it is true, in some of the
American courts, but which is demonstrably incorrect.
That the Court will compel and oversee the exercise of a
discretionary power in respect of charities -was decided in
Attorney-General v. Glegg, Ambler, 584; and that an
optional right to select could be postponed, and, therefore,
the right be destroyed at the pleasure of the trustees, was
evidently treated as absurd in Moggridge v. Thackwell.'
As to the first point, there is no fault to be found with the
abstract statement that the law requires certainty in a
devise; but it would be well to ascertain the meaning of
this rule. The law of the land vests property, when the
owner ceases to live, in some one, and his title is held precisely as was that of the deceased owner-i.e., by the law
of the land. Without discussing the political question how
far a dead man may control things after he ceases to exist,
all will agree that it is by the law of the land that he can
or cannot do this. And it necesarily follows that he must
name someone to be owner or describe him, so that he can
be ascertained, or the person named by the law must take.
There then arise two possible classes of cases, and this
seems to have created the confusion. A gift naming an owner
or one to take for himself or for someone else creates firo5erty-that is a-right in the person named to apply to his
own purposes. Now, there must be somebody who can
claim this right, who stands to the State as the owner and
can fulfil the duties of ownership; azid the second class
must be subject to the same rule-and, therefore, a gift to
a class, if indefinite, is void. Of course, all contingent
interests are included in this.
But the first thing to be noticed is how entirely untrue
is the statement of Judge WRIGHT as an abstraction. Assuming the New York Statute of Wills is not different in
this respect from all other statutes in the civilized world, no
one will say that a devise to A. for life with a power to appoint by deed or will is void, and yet it is quite certain that
17 Ves., p. 8 2.
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there is and can be no beneficiary except A. until he exercises the power, assuming the New York Statute of Wills
is not different from all other statutes of wills in the
civilized world. It is in this way only that the futility of
such extremely universal statements can be tested.
It may be granted that a mere power of appointment
without an immediate estate of any kind is void. There
are plain reasons for this ; but they are independent of any
statute of wills. But it is also quite certain that if the
devisees can be ascertained it is valid. What, therefore,
apparently was in the mind of Judge WRIGHT when he
made this somewhat exaggerated generalization was the
rule that governs trusts. He evidently is speaking of the
English law; his citation of Gallego v. The AttorneyGeneral,' a Virginia case, shows he was not dealing with
the question as one of provincial jurisprudence.
Now, the distinction that governs trusts is probably
most clearly brought out in a case that had the benefit of a
discussion by two great makers of the law-Lord ELDON
and Sir WILLIAM GRANT.' The trust was for "such
objects of benevolence and liberalityas the trustee in his own
-discretionshall most apjbrqve." It was conceded by all that

if the objects were not charitable the devise was void, for
the trust excluded a beneficial interest not declared, and
a trust without an object is void.3 The express trust precluded a possible beneficial interest in the trustee, and no
court could ascertain what purpose was intended. The
next of kin represented by Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr.
Bell (probably the great pleader) admitted that if it was a
charity, the indefiniteness was immaterial. It was decided

not to be a charity and hence void. It will be said (Judge
BROWN impliedly does say) that by that time the rule in
13 Leigh., 457.
2

Morice v. the Bishop of Durham (io Vez., 532 ; 9 Id., 399).
8Why it did not appear necessary to counsel or Court to give a
reason. If it were not it would result that property might be held for
the life of a trustee, belonging to no one and incapable of being used for
any purpose whatever. But the rule as the reason applies to all possible
forms of conveyancing. A resulting trust arises for the grantor or the
heir.
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the English Chancery was settled and hence the concession.
What is to be noticed is that if the devise is to a charity,
indefiniteness of the object is quite immaterial, and what
is the reason for this rule? Is it because of anything
peculiar to English. law that did not form part of the law
that came with our ancestors, and was part of our law
before .the Revolution? Has it anything to do with the
Statute 43 Eliz., or with prerogative, or with Cy-pres doctrine, as we generally understand those words? It is true
this was supposed, once upon a time, to be the case in Virginia, Maryland and by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Traces of this notion can be found everywhere.
Even in Pennsylvania, where the statute is not in force,
there was supposed to be a doctrine of some kind that was
called " The Equity of the Statute," that could maintain a
trust for persons incompetent to take, without any devises
capable of taking.' But it has been generally supposed for
forty-eight years past that all this was shown to be utterly
without any foothold other than a mistaken dictum of one
Chancellor, and the thing had been given up and abandoned.
In 1833, and before the publication of the "Record
Commission," the subject had been examined with a care
probably never before or since bestowed on such a question.
The judgment of Mr. Justice BALDWIN, in Magill v. Brown,
reprinted from a pamphlet in Brightly's Reports, covers 164
closely printed pages in small type. Its purpose was, and
it resulted in showing, that the jurisdiction over trusts for
charities, whire there was no trustee or one not competent
to take, was the ordinary jurisdiction over trusts of any and
every kind. It did not depend on any statute or prerogative, or arise out of either. If the object could be ascertained, it was absolutely unimportant whether there was
any one competent to take at law or not. There the devise
was to a treasurer of an unincorporated religious societyfor
the benefit of the Indians, and a bequest to the citizens of
a town in a foreign country, to fiurchase a fire engine and

1 It would be

a curiosity indeed to see how from the statute an equity

can be deduced..

One might as well look for equity in a commission of

Oyer and Terminer.

The thing is impossible if only the statute is read.
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keep it in repair, and these were held valid,- though
the persons named as devisees could not take at law, and
there was no person named to select the engine. The
demonstration that the 43 Eliz. had nothing to do with
this jurisdiction is found on p. 394;, that the right was
administered by the ordinary rules and principles of the
Court (p. 598). The prerogative is discarded on p. 403. It
is by virtue of one of the inherent powers of Chancery,
firoceeding as a Court of Equity, according to equity and
good conscience (p. 404). Tradition tells us six months
were given up to the preparation for this wonderful judgment. There is said to have been a prediction of what the
Records in the Tower would disclose if examined, which
was verified as to what the jurisdiction had been and how
it had been exercised from time immemorial by the
"Record Commission Publication."
When, therefore, we are told that this jurisdiction,
which recognizes an object or purpose, if it be charitable,
as a person for the purpose of sustaining a devise, was an
invention of "ecclesiastics," we must ask : Is that phrase
used to stigmatize the jurisdiction, and if it is, why not the
invention of the same persons of the mode of compelling
the execution of any trust and of fastening it on the property,
in place of leaving the party to an action? Surely one may
weigh in the balance the relative merits of a mind that can
see that the real beneficiaries are the persons whose miseries
will be alleviated by means of the use of property, and that
corporations or trustees to manage the fund and select the
patients to be treated are precisely what guardians or trustees for infants are-mere machinery to execute the purpose of the giver or administer property, with those who
can find in the want of such machinery a good reason for
destroying the right of the beneficiaries in the one case, but
not in the other. And it may be that the despised and
contemned " ecclesiastics" will turn the balance for largeness of mind and comprehension of what that is or should
be, by which mankind are governed and their property
disposed of, whi ch we call law. Which law is more worthy
of a seat in the bosom of God? It may be that such a
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decision as the one cited has escaped observation, but it
seems impossible that such a case as that of Mr. Girard's
will could have been overlooked. It could not have been
studied in any proper sense of that word. Above all, it is
quite impossible that the great argument could have been
even looked at.
The point of the case mentioned must be carefully
borne in mind, and it is not to be looked for merely in
the judgment. It could scarcely be expected that Judge
STORY should have brought out in very vivid colors the
fact that not only was his Court absolutely wrong in the
great case of Baptist Church v. Hart, but that he had volunteered a most learned note on the subject which was all
wrong too. During the argument he had the good taste
to hand to Mr. BINNEY a decision of SuGDEN'S, then Chancellor of Ireland, confirming all that he was contending for;
although in so doing he, STORY, was convicting himself of
error. As it is quite evident that Vidal v. Girard has not
been appreciated, possibly not looked at, it may as well be
stated. The devise was to a municipal corporation as a
trustee, to build a school, and select the scholars, first, from
the city, second, from the county, third from New Orleans,
and fourth from the world at large, and then educate them.
It was also quite clear-it was not disputed-that the trustee
was utterly incompetent to take the property and act as
trustee. And why? It is impossible to conceive anything
more incongruous than that a political corporation, the
membership of which is compulsory, and which is maintained by compulsory taxation only, can assume the duty
and the peril of a trustee-apart from what is the complete
objection-that it must act by agents, which a trustee cannot do. If a more grotesque incongruity in relations can
be suggested than this-of a political corporation acting the
part of a trustee-it is at least hard to find. The sanction
by the legislature was after the death. No one pretended
in that argument to rest the case on that. It was met-as
that lawyer met all his cases-by discarding all that was
not certain.
If the devise required for its validity the intervention
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of a trustee to be named in the will, it was void. That it
required a trustee to make the work possible was, of course,
admitted. This rule of law relied on was the common
law, independent of statute, prerogative, or any other consideration, than that there was a charitableuse, and equity, as
part of the law-and that the universalEnglish law, which

came here with the colonists-not a prerogative power unfitted for freemen. The outline of the argument is given
to show that every reason alleged in the Tilden case, as the
foundation of the jurisdiction which alone support such
trusts, was not only abandoned but disclaimed at the outset.
Mr. Binney well knew his argument would only be weakened by any claim on the ground of ecclesiastical polity or
religious sentiment or prerogative power. He claimed
under a system that had never had a Court of Chancery,
nor knew any other equity than such as was believed to be
capable of being administered by a court having its jurisdiction thus defined, that of the King's Bench at West-

minster. That is that simple rule which recognizes law
and equity as parts of the one system called law, for determining rights of property. His points were:
First.-That the error of the Courts of Virginia and
Maryland required a statement of only the most elementary principles to expose it.
Second.-That at law as distinguished from equity
there could never exist a title except in a person capable of
ascertainment, in whom all duties and in whom all rights
must vest at the death of the owner.
Third.-No claim is set up, because the will in every
sense defines the objects to be benefited. If a trust for
poor orphans generally, or poor children, or poor seamen,
or for the members of any class of the helpless or necessitous, however general the description, cannot be supported,
neither can this trust; nor will a suggestion be offered to
distinguish Girard's trust from these in favor of the former.
Fourth.-Uncertainty of persons to enjoy, until appointment or selection, is a never-failing attendant of a
charitabletrust.

It is impossible to put a proposition more evidently true
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as to all charities, or more distinctly contradictory to
that on which the decision in the Tilden case rests, so far
as any law other than local law not derived from England,
is concerned, and none that more distinctly shows the absence of even an apprehension of the true meaning of
uncertainty, when applied as a test of the validity under
the law of England, of a grant, whether by deed or will.
Can a charity be described which by its terms makes it
possible to define a person by name as entitled to the benefit,
without the intervention of a power to select? If this person is ascertained by the terms of the will then the gift
creates private property. All are familiar with cases where
this very thing created the doubt as to the intention.
Fifth -A gift to a class, such as the blind or orphans,
if charitable, is as effectual as a gift to the children of A.
for their own benefit.
After citing some authorities, he says: "Here are ten
cases, all before the 4 3 d Eliz., all of a solemn character, and
all of them incontestably clear to the point, that perpetual
charitable uses-for the poor, for the poorest of the six
nearest parishes; for poor men, decayed and unfortunate or
visited by the hand of God; to find a preacher in such a
place: for the maintenance of a master and usher of a free
grammar school; for a free school; for almsmen and almswomen-are good, lawful and valid uses by the common law
of England." Then in answer to the supposed necessity
of a vesting of a legal estate to maintain this equity: "There
is no court in England that has ever held such uses to be
void. I do not say that there is none to show that a legal
estate to uses may sometimes be void, but as to the uses
themselves, until the Mortmain Act of George II, there is
not an instance, there cannot be one. The general law of
England in matters of charity thoroughly carries out the
language of the Apostle, 'Charity never faileth,' and equity
not only declares the same thing but makes it effectual." "
Sixth.-Two other propositions are then stated the exact reverse of the postulates of Mr. Justice BROWN : (a) the
beneficiaries are the real owners, the trusts for them being
lawful, the incapacity of the trustee or the want of one is
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of no moment; (b) the defendants are entitled, upon general
principles, and by the constitution of a Court of Equity, to
have their valid trust protected in this Court, whatever may
be the defects of the legal estate, whenever the Court recognizes the rule that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.
Has any one ever heard that phrase qualified by the exclusion of charities?
The cases support this as an universal propositionthat 'all trusts rest on the same foundation, and the proof is
that the thing or property is bound. The authorities are
beyond the suspicion of being formulated by "medioval
ecclesiasticism."'
The application of the rule to charities
are all cases, since the revolution in 1688, except one by
Finch,2 and that was a devise of "tithes impropriate to
the curate and to all that should serve after him." The
devise being void, the heir was declared a trustee.Seventh.-It is part of the originaljurisdiction. It is
here (p. 114) Mr. BINNEY mentions the one solitary dictum
in 1798 of Lord LOUGHBOROUGH, that questions the original jurisdiction of equity in cases of charitable trusts before
the statute.
It would be unreasonable here to repeat all these authorities. They demonstrated the fact thus-by deciding
there is no jurisdiction under the statute, and directing the
litigation to be instituted in 'Chancery. Judge BALDWIN'S
opinion is a demonstration that the statement attributing
the jurisdiction to the statute is a mistake of FACT. If it.
were only remembered that the statute was, as stated by
Sir ORLANDO BRIDGEMAN,' designed to create a more
effectual system for administering charities and hunting up
fraudulent trustees, the wonderful mistakes as to its effect
would have been avoided. The title to the act really indi1 Co. Litt., 29o b; Mr. Butler's note, 113 a; Mr. Hargraves' note, and
a string of decisions.
2 2 Ventris, 349.

3 That the Statute of 43 Eliz. has nothing to do with this rule, see 2 My.
& K., 581; Shelford, 630. There is also a case (i Eden, io) where it is
thus stated: "A void conveyance was aided before, during and since the
statute."
I i Ch. C., 157.
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cates its intent: "It is an act to redress the mis-emlloyment of lands, etc., heretofore given to charitable uses."
It then creates a commission and gives them power to inquire into and redress wrong. As Mr. BINNEY remarks:
"It has been abandoned as useless and inconvenient, and
the ordinary jurisdiction resorted to." Can it be supposed
that such a statute was intended to give validity to past
transactions that, being illegal, were void?
It would seem that there was, on the part of Judge
WRIGHT

and Judge BROWN, forgetfulness of an important

fact in the judicial history of England, that the contest
and doubt as to the power of the Chancery to disregard the
forms of law, when they made plain legal purposes impossible of execution, were not confined to charities. Long
after this jurisdiction had been applied to that class of devises, the question arose, in 1675, as to mere private
interests, the effectuating of which required the intervention of some one, and there was no such person named.
A will devised lands to be sold and the proceeds distributed
between the heir and three nephews.' Observe the facts,
and compare them with the position deemed fatal by Judge
He says: "The Tilden trust (the beneficiary)
BROWN.
takes nothing by the will," and .evidently thinks this vital.
In Pell v. Pelham there was no estate or property in the
land given to the devisees that was owned by the testator
or passed by the will. There was a power by inference
and no one named to exercise it. There was a direction,
but it was given to no one. This was all.
At the present day it is quite probable many really
good lawyers would not even be able to see that there was
any question either as to the rights or the mode of getting
at them. Yet the best lawyer of that day could see neither
right nor remedy. Neither could there be except through
equity. The Lord Keeper dismissed the bill to enforce the
direction, because no one was named to execute thefoower.
The Lords declared the heir must sell and distribute the
money. This is now so commonplace that we would call
the rule self-evident.
I Pell v. Pelham, i Levinz., 309.
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Now is it not plain-it is not certain-that there is nothing in the fact that the beneficiaries take nothing, or that
their right depends on the power of the Court to compel
somebody to deal with what is his estate by law, as if he

had been made a trustee for that purpose and had accepted
the trust, though he does not take under the will?
As to this portentous monster called Cy-pres-and the
prerogative-let us consider what it means before first insisting on its necessity and then on its illegality. Under
this head or title when the Court exercises the so-called Cypres Power as a Court of Chancery, and as distinguished
from the Power under the prerogative, we find that the

Court cannot vary a charity if it is defined, merely because
it is useless.' But when there is a devise to "such lyingin hospital as his executor might select," and there was no
executor, the Court selected.' "All and every the hospitals" include all in the town. 3 A devise for augmentation of collections "for the benefit of poor Dissenting
ministers ;" "a devise to a particular charity which was
dissolved before the death of the testator ;" blanks left for
the names of the charities ; "to the poor," all come under
the ordinary jurisdiction of trusts.
The distinction between the cases in which the Court
or the Crown act is so fine that it seems to have escaped
attention. It is this : In those cases where the testator has
evinced no intention to commit the dispiosalof his pirofierti,

to any one, there the object or purpose creates a valid gift,
but it is executed by virtue of the power of the Crown
under the sign manual ; but if there are or were intended
to be trustees, the power is in the Court.' The subject is
thoroughly discussed in Moggridge v. Thackwell ;5 but the
distinction is not because of prerogative;it is because in the
former case the trustee is the king, and he is not amenable
to the jurisdiction. It is because the king takes as constitutional truslee6-- as a trustee for property where there
is a beneficiary but no legal owner. See 4 My. & K., 584,
for an admission as to this being the point decided.
I Boyle, 162 ; Atty.-Gen. v. Manfield,
3Id.
2 Boyle, 170.
07

Ves., 83.

6Id., 83.

2

Russ., 5O.
4

Boyle, 213.
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Certainly, one may be permitted to express astonishinent that such conclusions could possibly be drawn in
New York from such premises. Some may recall the settlement, in Burgess v. Wheat, of the long-disputed question as to the effect on the equitable estate by the escheat
of the legal estate because of the death of the trustees without heirs. Could an American Court be induced to sit
patiently through such an argument? Yet it is this very
thing, only in another form, that raises up this unknown
and, therefore, fearful creature, prerogative, as if the duty
to give property to the real owner, because the legal title
vested in the Crown ought not to extend to republics. Or
as if a Court is not entitled to say that when there is a
devise to A., in trust for B., the Court will recognize B.'s
title if A. happens to die without heirs or has forfeited his
estates for felony. Is it to be wondered that even chancellors occasionally overlooked foundations for their decisions and thought only of the question who was the owner,
and not how the Court got the right to give him his property?
The only question then is, it being essential that there
must be a beneficiary ascertained or ascertainable, are the
purposes declared in the Tilden will sufficient for this
purpose ? It is quite unnecessary to discuss the question as
to the power of the Court when no purpose other than a
charitable one generally is stated. For, so far as the
Tilden Trust is concerned, that purpose is a library and
reading-room in a city, and it is admitted it is a charity,
and the supposed difficulty is identical with that in thie case of
the Sailors' Snug Harbor, and there the question arose at
common law and not in equity-the devisees were incapable
of taking, and the distinction is that there there was a direction to .apply, while in Mr. Tilden's will there is only
an authority or power to apply to the legislature for powers.
If that could be compelled (about which it seems difficult
to conceive that there can be a doubt) the distinction relied
on does not exist. The objection was the same in both
cases; it was optional in both cases. In the one case the
option was with the legislature to grant; in the other in
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the trustees to apply-i. e., there is a distinction-there is
not a difference.
The alternative trust is any wide and substantial
benefit to tMe intei-ests of mankind. The considerations

drawn from this may be distmissed, (i) because no stress is
laid on it, but it is coupled with the former and agreed
to be a charity in the sense of the h.nglish rule. No
attempt is made to bring it within the rule in Maurice z.
Bishop of Durham. (2) The fact that the alternative
power was illegal could not make void the one that was
legal.' A reference to Chamberlain v. Brockett' has induced asuspicion that the devise in the Tilden case may have
been supposed to be on a condition precedent, and, as was
there stated by Lord SELBORNE, if that was a thing which
might not certainly happen within the period limited by
law, the devise would be void for indefiniteness. The condition there was, if somebody should happen to furnish
land for the building. But the fact that the property was
devoted to charity made this quite unimportant. So that
it is evident the Court of New York rejected the general intention to create a charity, though there were persons
named to devise a scheme, and that the Court treats the
discretion in selecting as a condition precedent to the vesting. If this be so, it is obvious that a direction to -distribute among named charities then established is made
void by conferring on the trustee either the power to select
or the power to determine the amount each shall have.
And further, the same result must follow if, in place of
charities, the beneficiaries are children of a particular
person. The reference to the Cy-pres doctrine might still
further be noticed. There have been very wrong things
done in the name of that doctrine, certainly; but one may
venture to doubt if any one who sneers at the rule is aware
of its meaning, and has not mistaken a few abuses for the
rule. That it has no possible bearing on this case is beyond
question. It only really applies where the puerose qf the
ftunder is changed. It has no possible application to a
case where the purpose of the founder can be executed.'
12 11. & KeeU, 576.

2L. R., 8 Ch., 2o6.

3 Boyle, i5o.
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But there has been more than enough said to show that it
is a mere bugbear-horrible only because unknown.
So far as the Tilden case is concerned, if the doctrine of
Courts of Equity in reference to charitable uses is supposed
to be unfit for freemen, in the ordinary case of its application, one might appeal to the common sense and the universal practice of mankind. What ought to be done with
a fund given to charity, where the purpose has ceasedsuch as the redemption of prisoners from the Barbary
States, or the disseminating of information as to slavery in
the Southern States? There is no more conspicuous application of the doctrine of Cy-pres than is found in the case
of Dartmouth College v. WGodward.' The foundation was
for the education of the Indians and for the civilizing and
Christianizing of the children of pagans. The funds were
contributed for the spreading of knowledge of the only
true God and Saviour among the American savages.' The

institution was converted into an ordinary college for the
education of the youth of the State because the objects had
ceased to exist. It is true that the Court was not asked
to do this, but the trustees nevertheless did it. The point
decided was that the State could not vary the charter
authorizing this in respect of the mode used in selecting
the administrators of the charity, though it was used
to educate their own youth. No one had ever questioned
the right to divert the funds from their original destination
to another and analogous purpose, because the original
purposes were no longer possible.' Surely, this was better
than embezzling them, which was the alternative.
The only possible excuse for not appointing a trustee
for a purpose or object is the absence of a person named
having a locus standi to ask the intervention of the Court.
What can be said in defence of a "destruction of a public
benefaction on such a ground, but that the State is regardless of its duty, if such be its law?
In the Tilden case there were such trustees, and the
machinery was perfected, and if there had been no such
persons it was absolutely immaterial. All is lost-all this
14 Wh., 524.

2P- 535.

3 See Mr. Webster's recital of the facts, p. 552.
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most beneficent, most magnificent dedication of propertythis splendid monument to the owner, and upon reasons
such as have been pointed out! It cannot be denied that
they are technical. They could not be otherwise, whether
right or wrong, but they are so technical that the common
mind must fail to grasp them; if well founded they are
technical in the worst sense. An authority to ask for the
machinery, and a duty to ask it. This divides the good
from the bad. Can we, governed by such niceties, afford
to sneer at the schoolmen, or at the medimval ecclesiastics
who laid the foundations for that jurisprudence which has
so certainly commended itself to men that when the rules
of property and the rules of evidence recognized in equity
differ from those of the law, the former must always prevail? This is the English notion of that which is the creation of their lawyers without the aid of one iota of legislation. Did any system of law ever- before receive such a
crown, such a proof of admitted superiority from those who
understood the subject?
If, then, there are any provincial reasons that have
even unconsciously compelled a departure from the law
that our English forefathers brought with them, it may be
accepted as certain there is not the faintest proof of anything in the law for the past three centuries that can be
twisted into a support of that departure, and the decision in the State of New York must be reorganized as quite
as local and provincial as one on the custom of Cornwall ;
indeed far more so, for that, while provincial in England,
is in accord with the mining law of all countries and all
times.
This paper may most aptly be concluded by a quotation
from the close of the argument so frequently referred to
already. In winding up his argument (which Judge BALDWIN said could not be reported, for even he, familiar with
the subject as he was, found himself left behind if he ventured to make a note), Mr. BINNEY said: "Thus stands
the law of Pennsylvania on the subject of charitable uses,
and so, I trust, it ever will stand. While we do not ask to
impose it upon other States against their will, we are happy
that the adjudications of this Court, over and over again
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pronounced, bind them not to disturb its operation upon
ourselves.
"In two of the States of this Union, the decision in
the Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, seems to have
been adopted, and indeed to have been carried beyond the
precise limits of that judgment, which only refused to establish a charitable use for education, bequeathed to an unincorporated association, incapable of taking at law; and did
not, except by the reasoning of the Court, touch the case of
a bequest of the same nature to competent trustees. Such
cases, -however, have since fallen before the judgments of
Courts of Chancery, both in Maryland and Virginia. The
Maryland doctrine is to be found in Trippe v. Frazier,' ana
Dashiel v. the Attorney-General. 2 Tlhe case of Gallego's
Executors v. Attorney-General,' in the Court of Appeals of
Virginia, adopted the same doctrine, and rejects charitable
uses, whether there be competent trustees or not, if the
objects of the charity are uncertain, in that sense which
calls for selection at the discretion of anybody. But I
think I cannot be mistaken in saying as to all these cases,
that the learned judges adopted as the basis of their judgments the error in point of fact, which led to the judgment
in the Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors-namely,
that the law of charities originated in the 4 3 d Eliz., and
that, independent of that statute, a Court of Chancery cannot by its ordinary jurisdiction sustain a charitable use,
which, if not a charity, would on general principles be void. 4
What influence the fact of the original jurisdiction of
Chancery, as it now appears, would have had upon the
respective courts, if it had been shown to them, it is of
little use to conjecture.
"In the other States the result has been uniformly
otherwise. I regard it as impossible to select from any
judicial reports a body of more thoroughly able and learned
arguments by both counsel and judges, than are to be found
on this question in the various reports of cases to which
14 Harris &J., 446.
Harris &J., 392; Same v. Same, C. Harris &J., i.
3 3 Leigh, 450.
4Vid. 5 Harris &J., 398; 6 Harris &J., 7; 3 Leigh, 468.
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